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lN TIIE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Tn the interest of
No. 15312
PRISBREY, DAVID (6/3/59)
A person under eighteen years of age.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case seeks to determine whether the proclamation of the Governor
establishing a maximum 55 MPH speed limit expired by its own terms prior
to the date of the alleged violation by the driver.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge John Farr Larson determined that the 55 MPH maximum speed limit
established by the Utah Governor on January 2, 1974, was still in effect on
December 8, 1976. He found the charge against the driver to be true and
assessed a fine.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the SSMPH maximum speed limit established by
the proclamation of the Utah Governor on January 2, 1974, determined by the
Supreme Court to have expired by its own terms prior to December 8, 1976.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The youthful driver in this case was driving home from work on December
8, 1976. He had entered Interstate l.S headed South from the Fifth South onramp in Salt Lake City. The driver was stopped by a Highway Patrol Officer
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and referred to the Juvenile Court for exceeding the posted 55 MPH limit.
The attorney for the young person filed a motion to dismiss supported
by a memorandum of authorities.

The Juvenile Court ruled against the con

tention of the driver that the 55 mile rule had no force and effect on the 8th
day of CE'cember, 1976. The Court assessed a fine against the driver and
the driver appealed.
POINT I
THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GOVERNOR OF JANUARY 2, 1974, EXPIRED ON THE BASIS OF ITS OWN PREMISES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 8, 19
The Governor in Utah does not have law making power under the Consti
tution of Utah. By Article VI, Section 1 of the constitution the legislative
power is vPsted in the legislature and in the people if they exercise the init
tive or referendum.
During World War II the Legislature gave power to the Governor to pro
claim speed limits to fonform to the recommendations of federal authority
time of war or national emergency. This grant of authority is embodied in
Section 41-6-46 (4) of the Utah Code.
This is not a transfer of the power of the legislature to make law. Sud
would be an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

This statute essentia:

gives the Governor administrative rule making power to conform with feder
recommendations upon his determination that there is a war or national ef11
gency and there is a recommendation of federal authorities.
On January 2, 1974, the Utah Governor did issue a proclamation.
the usual proclamation form.

It contained whereas clauses.

clause referred to Section 41-6-46 (4) of the Utah Code.

It wa

The first whe

The second where

clause had its foundation in H. R. 11372 of January 2, 1974.
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tive language of the proclamation is based. They take the place of the usual
fact findings of traditional rule making procedures.

rJ·

R. 11372 did not declare a national emergency. It declared a fuel

conservation policy during a period of current and imminent fuel shortage.
It used the power of the federal purse to coerce state action to adopt a 55
MPH rule in conformity with the fuel shortage problem.

It gave the states

60 days to adopt the limit before the federal bucks would be cut off.
This opportunity suited Governor Rampton. He had proposed a 55 mile
limit for urban areas theretofore but his proposal didn't take with the Road
Commission or others having powers with respect to speed limits. He
issued the proclamation almost before the ink was dry on Richard Nixon's
signature on H. R. 11372.
A budget session of the Utah Legislature was set to convene within two
weeks. The budget session could have considered the problem and dealt
with it inasmuch as it involved important fiscal matters involving the flow
of federal highway money into and out of the state coffers.
The Governor made his move after attributing national emergency status
to the fuel shortage circumstances.
The Utah Supreme Court sustained the proclamation of the Governor notwithstanding its own observations that the energy crisis was probably not as
serims as forecasted.

State vs. Foukas, Case NO). 1413.S, filed January 24,

1977. What that case did not tell us was whether the proclamation continued
to have validity after its uncertain emergency character at its inception.
H. R. ll372hadanexpirationdateofJune30, 197.S. H. R.11372was
repPaied by Public Law 93-643, Section 154 of Title 23 of the United States
Code.
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The statutory foundation of the proclamation of the Governor was there!
destroyed by Act of Congress on January 4, 1975.
The federal government kept to its policy of a national 5.5 mile limit
but all references

to

national emergency or fuel shortage were deleted. Tl

new legislation required state action pursuant to the new statute. No new
action sanctioned by Utah law was taken after January 4, 1975.
In any event the original federal statute defining the fuel shortage as its
premise for federal funding control would have expired by its own terms on
June 30, 1975. There could have been no valid effect for the Governor's Ru
after the termination date of the federal statute on which the Governor pre·
mised his action.
This state of affairs leads logically to this question: Does a proclamat
of the Governor acquire an independent life of its own that can go on foreve
irrespective of changes of circumstance that prompted the proclamation?
It was the position of the trial judge in this case that the proclamation

would go on forever unless the Governor himself made a new declaration o:
repeal.
On the other hand, Judge Christofferson of the District Court of Box Eli
County has taken the other position and has ruled that the proclamation is r
longer effective because the Arab oil embargo no longer exists. Judge
Christofferson so ruled in the case of State Vs. Mansfield, Criminal No.
1722 in the District Court of Box Elder County on August 15, 1977.

A notice

of appeal has been filed by the Box Elder County Attorney and should be
pending in rte Supreme Court shortly. The Court will thus be confronted
with contrary decisions on this issue from the trial courts.
In this respect it is worth noting that H. R. 11372 itself was framed in
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temporary terms.

Section 2 (e) of the Act provided that the act would no longer

be effective on the date when the President should declare that there was no
longer a fuel shortage or June 30, 1975, whichever should occur first.
The legislation was not even passed in a permanent form.

It was passed

as a resolution and signed by the President but was not even codified in the
U. S. Code. The new permanent legislation is codified as Section 154 of
Title 23 but it is adopted as a matter of ongoing national policy with no
reference to any emergency.
While it is now generally recognized that there must be long term adjustments in energy usage in this country, the plans for the adjustments are generally aiming at supply problems in the mid-nineteen eighties. In the absence
of sudden interruption of supply no petroleum crisis is expected until that time.
It is the national plan to ease out of heavy petroleum reliance so that the
crisis may never arrive.
In the meantime it is the proper function of the Legislature to make
permanent laws. There have been four scheduled meetings of the Utah
Legislature since H. R. 11372 became effective. There have been one or
more special sessions since that time. TheLegislature could have taken
permanent action if it had been so inclined.
Actually, the Legislature did enact 55 mile legislation in the 1977
Regular sEssion. but it was vetoed by the Governor. This legislation was

H. B. 79.
We are left in the highly unusual circumstance of a legislature having
made an effort to comply with the federal statute vetoed by a governor while
a governor's proclamation is being enforced by the executive branch and some
1

't

the courts.
Whatever virtuous motivations the Governor may have or the
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Legislature may have, the effect of the present posture is that the executivt
says we do it my way or not at all.

We are thus left in a posture, if the

Supreme Court holds the 55 mile proclamation to still be effective, where
the Governor makes the law and the Legislature is not permitted to.
I do not mean to impugn two good governors and many conscientious
legislators. But we have arrived at a circumstance where we are following
neither the letter nor the spirit of our State Constitution.

Article V Sectior

1 of the Constitution of Utah provides that the powers of the government of

the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legis
lative, the Executive and the Judicial and no person charged with the exerc1
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise a;
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in cases herein expre
directed or permitted.
While

th~

action of the Governor of January 2, 1974, has been sustained

by the Supreme Court, it is best that the public action which might be prop:
in time of crisis should not be allowed to run beyond its proper time to the
detriment of our constitutional system. The Supreme Court should deterrn
that the Governor's proclamation became null and void On January 4, 1975'
June 30, 1975. Better logic would suggest the use of the date when H. R. L
was repealed on January 4, 1975.
POINT II
THE SPEED LIMIT RULE DEBACLE HAS CREATED A SITUATION
WHERE NO DRIVER CAN KNOW WHAT LAW IS VIOLATED AND
AN ACCUSED IS THUS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News of Wednesday, August 2-!, 19'
carried stories to the effect that the Attorney General had advised highwa
patrolmen in the First Judicial District to write speed tickets carrying ini
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

charging an accused with either violation of the Governor's proclamation
or the prima facie speed law. This compounds the confusion surrounding
the 55 mile rule. There should be no difference in one district from what
goes on elsewhere in the state. The law, whatever it is, is the same statewide and should be enforced the same way statewide. We are not dealing with
a pornography case where some local standards may be applied.
This procedure is especially bad because it leaves the public grossly
confused. The proclamation of the Governor is either valid or it is not
valid.

Policemen, prosecutors and judges should not be offered a smorgas-

bord from which they can select a basis for a charge. Due process requires
that the accused should know of the claim against him without being subjected
to a game of official roulette in looking for a legal peg to hang a charge on.
If the Legislature had made the law, there would be no need for every police-

man, prosecutor or judge

to

make the law.

While this current recommendation of the Attorney General has no bearing
on this case, it is symptomatic of what has been happening all along.

After

the proclamation of the Governor, someone in official circles must have had
some doubt. On January 25, 1974, the State Road Commission approved a
resolution declaring a 55 MPH rule pursuant to Section 27-12-121 of the
Utah Code. The Highway Commission moved again in 1975 after the repeal
of H. R. ll372.

On May 23, 1975, it again resolved that the speed limit

should be 55 MPH at a maximum pursuant to Section 27-12-121 of the Utah
C:ode and reciting the Act of Congress of January 4, 1975.
In the case before Judge Christofferson, the Mansfield case, Judge
Chri.stofferson had originally ruled that Mansfield could be tried on a 55 mile
rule, but that the 55 mile limit would be a prim a fac ie limit. In doing so he
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expressed his approval of a learned memorandum of th'= Honorable Bryant H.

Croft, dated March 17, 1975, in the District Court of Salt Lake County. Tr
memorandum resulted from the cases of State ve. Andreini and State Vs. f
Cr. Nos. 27436 and 2703-L Judge Croft ruled that the proclamation of the
Governor was invalid but that he considered the action of the Road Commis
having established a 55 MPH prima facie speed limit.
After the Supreme Court Ruling in the Foukas case, the complaint
against Mansfield was amended to charge him with a violation of the Goven
Proclamation which Judge Christofferson then ruled was no longer effective
In another case before Judge Cornaby of the Layton City Court, the Jud[
followed the Croft theory with his own variation that while the 55 MPH rule
was a prima facie rule, that the State would have the burden of proving the
unreasonableness of speed in excess of 55 MPH. This was in the c"as e of
State Vs. Mansfield, no case number. The decision was dated December!
1975. The state then declined to proceed in the case and the case was dror
Recent news storied tell of Provo City Judges disposing of 55 MPH case
as fuel wasting cases because of their concern with the 55 MPH rule.
The point of this recitation is that the official action of the Governor
and the Highway Commission has created a situation of legal chaos such th
these learned judges have all come up with an array of different results th:
demonstrate that it has been inherently impossible for anyone to know what
the speed limit has been during various times since January 2, 1974. If
these gooo judges could come up with their varying reactions to the 55 MPr
rule, where is the average citizen to find simple, clear guidelines as to
what the speed law was in Utah.
An inherently vague state of affairs has resulted which demonstrates
the vague nature of the rule. This makes the rule roid for vagueness unde
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Article J Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and under Amendments V and XIV
of the Federal Constitution.
POINT III
THE STATE ITSELF APPARENTLY DOESN'T REALLY BELIEVE
THAT THE GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION rs VALID
On the 26th day of August, 1977, the Highway Commission passed an
emergency resolution establishing a new 55 MPH rule. They presumably
based the rule on certain data from the Federal Department of Transportation which tended to show that their had been fewer road deaths since the
55 Mile Rule had been in effect. This was apparently a pretense at coming
up with a prima facie 55 Mile Rule based on some sort of traffic study.
The action was apparently a holding action to keep the public from driving
faster until the next Legislature can meet and take care of the problem.
This action of the Commission is undoubtedly void and is undoubtedly based
on its fear of losing federal funds rather than on a reasoned reaction to
highway safety
The point of this reference, however, is that the State itself apparently
does not really believe the Governor's Proclamation to still be in effect and
has rushed in to fill its pending financial vacuum.
CONCWSION
The Supreme Court should reverse the decision of the Second District
Juvenile Court and direct dismissal of the charge against the young person.
Respectfully submitted

GRANT M. PRISBREY
Attorney For Appellant
I hereby certify that I delivered
copies of this brief to the office
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of the Attornev General on the

day of

, 1977.

